Two major categories of philosophical argument for God are arguments from being, and arguments from order. That there is something rather than nothing, and order rather than disorder, is taken to imply that there is an intelligent, willful creator - a God. But does this hold up to scrutiny?
No - on the contrary, when understood in the most general and metaphysical sense, being and order are uncreatable - what I like to call “immune to fiat”. A supposed God might say "fiat lux", but cannot do the same for being and order.
If there is something rather than nothing - being rather than utter nonbeing - then this cannot have a cause, since anything that might be called a cause must itself be in some sense. If being cannot have a cause, then it cannot be caused by a creator.
If there is order rather than disorder, then this likewise cannot have a cause, since to say that something was caused is to presuppose that order was already in place. If it weren't, things would not be themselves, effects would not follow causes, and a willful act of creation could never get off the ground.
Since being and order cannot have been caused, they exemplify the aseity (from-self-ness), eternity, and ultimacy commonly attributed by the religious to God. There's nothing that being and order could have come from. You might, if you were feeling puckish, rearrange this to say that being and order "came from nothing" - the ultimate free lunch.
This means that being rather than nonbeing, and order rather than disorder, do not imply a creator and so cannot be taken as evidence of one. Because being and order cannot be willful creations, and are therefore not artifacts reflecting design and intent, they are natural.
Theists might say, well, how do you know that being and order aren't ultimately properties of, or somehow "within", God? But being and order transcend and are presupposed by the conception of any specific entity, such as a God - just as stone transcends any form it might possibly take - a mountain, a canyon, or a sculpture. Being and order don't entail God any more than stone entails Michelangelo's David.
Note that this is so even if you try to equate God with "being itself", since being and order need not - and when understood in the most abstract, metaphysical, unconditioned and general sense, cannot - have the personal and providential qualities nor the agency associated with God. To put it another way, the conception of God necessarily involves being and order, but the conception of being and order doesn't necessarily involve God.
It follows that any hypothetical godlike being would be contingent, merely representing one form that being and order might take. Since that contingent form would itself stand in need of causal explanation, it would not be the ultimate, eternal and transcendent God that classical theism strives to substantiate. Capital-G God is therefore impossible, and a small-g god, à la Zeus - though logically conceivable as a caused and contingent entity - cannot be the root of the metaphysical hierarchy, a position inherently filled by natural being and order. These are the true "first things", which are neither God nor created by God.
Summary:
1. Being and order cannot have been created, so a creator is unnecessary and a naturalist metaphysics is perfectly tenable.
2. Being and order are necessary but not sufficient conditions to establish the existence of a God, which would require further personal qualities and agency that do not have the aseity, eternity and ultimacy of being and order. Thus, those further qualities are contingent and require a cause. Since a caused and contingent capital-G "God" is analytically incoherent, there can be no such thing.
No - on the contrary, when understood in the most general and metaphysical sense, being and order are uncreatable - what I like to call “immune to fiat”. A supposed God might say "fiat lux", but cannot do the same for being and order.
If there is something rather than nothing - being rather than utter nonbeing - then this cannot have a cause, since anything that might be called a cause must itself be in some sense. If being cannot have a cause, then it cannot be caused by a creator.
If there is order rather than disorder, then this likewise cannot have a cause, since to say that something was caused is to presuppose that order was already in place. If it weren't, things would not be themselves, effects would not follow causes, and a willful act of creation could never get off the ground.
Since being and order cannot have been caused, they exemplify the aseity (from-self-ness), eternity, and ultimacy commonly attributed by the religious to God. There's nothing that being and order could have come from. You might, if you were feeling puckish, rearrange this to say that being and order "came from nothing" - the ultimate free lunch.
This means that being rather than nonbeing, and order rather than disorder, do not imply a creator and so cannot be taken as evidence of one. Because being and order cannot be willful creations, and are therefore not artifacts reflecting design and intent, they are natural.
Theists might say, well, how do you know that being and order aren't ultimately properties of, or somehow "within", God? But being and order transcend and are presupposed by the conception of any specific entity, such as a God - just as stone transcends any form it might possibly take - a mountain, a canyon, or a sculpture. Being and order don't entail God any more than stone entails Michelangelo's David.
Note that this is so even if you try to equate God with "being itself", since being and order need not - and when understood in the most abstract, metaphysical, unconditioned and general sense, cannot - have the personal and providential qualities nor the agency associated with God. To put it another way, the conception of God necessarily involves being and order, but the conception of being and order doesn't necessarily involve God.
It follows that any hypothetical godlike being would be contingent, merely representing one form that being and order might take. Since that contingent form would itself stand in need of causal explanation, it would not be the ultimate, eternal and transcendent God that classical theism strives to substantiate. Capital-G God is therefore impossible, and a small-g god, à la Zeus - though logically conceivable as a caused and contingent entity - cannot be the root of the metaphysical hierarchy, a position inherently filled by natural being and order. These are the true "first things", which are neither God nor created by God.
Summary:
1. Being and order cannot have been created, so a creator is unnecessary and a naturalist metaphysics is perfectly tenable.
2. Being and order are necessary but not sufficient conditions to establish the existence of a God, which would require further personal qualities and agency that do not have the aseity, eternity and ultimacy of being and order. Thus, those further qualities are contingent and require a cause. Since a caused and contingent capital-G "God" is analytically incoherent, there can be no such thing.
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